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INTRODUCTION  
There is a common misperception among charity
1
 leaders and the 
public that public charities are prohibited from lobbying and 
legislative activities. Nothing could be further from the truth. As 
discussed more fully below, section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code does restrict the amount of lobbying that charities can do by 
prohibiting a charity qualifying for exemption from federal income 
tax under that provision from engaging in legislative activities as a 
“substantial part” of its activities.2 Section 170(c)(2)(D) contains a 
similar restriction for organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions.
3
 But charities making an election under section 501(h) 
                                                                                                                 
1 “Charity” refers to all organizations defined in sections 501(c)(3) and 509(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 509(a) (2006). 
2 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 501(a) exempts from income tax, inter alia, organizations 
described in section 501(c)(3):  
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
Id.  
3 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Section 170(c) defines “charitable contribution” as “a 
contribution or gift to or for the use of,” inter alia, the following: 
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—  
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are not subject to the “substantial part” test (“Substantial Part Test”).4 
Rather, organizations electing under 501(h) can engage in certain 
lobbying activity to the extent of specified limits, which are expressed 
solely in terms of dollar amounts.
5
 Section 501(h) permits eligible 
organizations to elect the “expenditure test” (“Expenditure Test”) as a 
substitute for the Substantial Part Test.
6
 In fact, charities that make 
the 501(h) election can engage in extensive legislative activities, 
almost without limitation, if the lobbying is properly structured. 
Confusion over the lobbying limitations imposed by both the 
Substantial Part Test and the Expenditure Test, rather than any real 
and substantive limits on lobbying by public charities, actually limits 
legislative activity by charities. This, in turn, limits the unique 
benefits that public charities can provide to society. 
This Article first explores the Substantial Part Test and the 
Expenditure Test, focusing on their basic structures and the legislative 
history surrounding the enactment of each test. The next Part 
examines the policy reasons for permitting public charities to lobby 
without restriction
7
 and notes the lack of convincing policy 
explanations for the restrictions contained in the Code.  
The Article concludes that the restrictions on lobbying under 
501(c)(3) are ambiguous, confusing, and ineffective. Indeed, most 
                                                                                                                 
 
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, 
or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, 
or any possession of the United States;  
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;  
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual; and  
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) 
by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.  
I.R.C. § 170(c).  
4 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (noting that the Substantial Part Test applies except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (h)). 
5 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1), (2). 
6 I.R.C. § 501(h)(3). 
7 Permitting private foundations to engage in legislative speech would not achieve the 
same goals. Accordingly, legislative activity is and should remain a taxable expenditure for 
private foundations under section 4945 but subject to the liberal rules of Treasury Regulation § 
53.4945. See discussion regarding private foundations infra Part IV.A.1. 
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charities electing the Expenditure Test under section 501(h) can lobby 
extensively, provided that the charity properly structures its lobbying 
to take advantage of the liberal rules and definitions under section 
501(h) and utilizes “cheap” methods of lobbying. Given the benefits 
of increased and improved legislative discourse through lobbying by 
charities and the inefficacy and innate complexity of the restrictions 
on lobbying, section 501(c)(3) should be amended to permit unlimited 
legislative activities by all public charities. As a distant second 
choice, this Article suggests improving and simplifying the 
Expenditure Test and making it the default test for legislative 
activities by public charities. 
I. THE SUBSTANTIAL PART TEST 
The Substantial Part Test, derived from the language of section 
501(c)(3), is the standard used to measure the lobbying activity of 
most public charities.
8
 Section 501(c)(3) provides that organizations 
organized and operated for certain specified purposes will be entitled 
to exemption from federal income tax if, inter alia, “no substantial 
part of the [organization’s] activities . . . is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (h)) . . . .”9 Accordingly, the Substantial Part 
Test causes an organization to lose its exemption (and incur an excise 
tax) if a “substantial part” of the organization’s activities consist of 
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence 
legislation.
10
 An organization that fails the Substantial Part Test 
becomes an action organization, and is deemed not to be operated 
exclusively for exempt purposes.
11
 Organizations that forfeit 
exemption for flunking the Substantial Part Test also are subject to an 
excise or penalty tax in an amount equal to 5 percent of lobbying 
expenditures incurred in the year that exemption is lost.
12
 Managers 
also may be subject to penalty taxes.
13
 A 501(c)(3) organization is 
subject to the Substantial Part Test unless it affirmatively elects the 
                                                                                                                 
8 More than 90 percent of public charities remain subject to the Substantial Part Test. 
CLPI Public Policy Positions: IRS Rules Governing Charitable Lobbying, CENTER FOR 
LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., www.clpi.org/protect-advocacy-rights/clpipublicpolicy (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012). But see infra notes 142, 147–148 and accompanying discussion, which suggests 
that less than 2 percent of eligible organizations have actually made the § 501(h) election. 
9 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
10 These rules do not apply to organizations that have made an election under section 
501(h). Id. 
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2008).  
12 I.R.C. § 4912(a). Organizations that make the election under section 501(h), churches 
and their affiliates, and private foundations are not subject to the excise tax. I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2). 
13 I.R.C. § 4912(b). 
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Expenditure Test.
14
 In other words, the Substantial Part Test is the 
default test for determining whether an organization has engaged in 
excessive lobbying.  
The Substantial Part Test is an entirely subjective test. No one, 
including the Internal Revenue Service (“Service” or “IRS”), knows 
when lobbying becomes “substantial.”15 Courts (and presumably the 
IRS as well) generally make the determination of substantiality by 
applying a balancing, or facts-and-circumstances, test.
16
 The results 
are both imprecise and inconsistent.
17
 Although a few early cases 
attempted to devise a quantitative test,
18
 more recently, courts have 
opted for a more subjective balancing test under which all of the facts 
and circumstances are weighed “in the context of the objectives and 
circumstances of the organization.”19 This balancing test is no more 
than a “smell test”; it is quite vague and provides almost no guidance 
to an organization wishing to influence legislation in furtherance of 
its exempt purposes without jeopardizing its exempt status.  
In addition to absence of clarity on the concept of substantiality, 
critical concepts and terms are undefined under the Substantial Part 
Test. Even the term “lobbying” is not well defined. The Substantial 
Part Test fails even to address consistently the fundamental question 
of what activities lobbying is to be measured against.
20
 
The most significant danger of the vagueness in the Substantial 
Part Test is its propensity to scare charities into non-activity on the 
legislative front with its lack of direction and guidance and the 
                                                                                                                 
14 See infra Part II (discussing Expenditure Test); I.R.C. § 501(h) (providing the 
Expenditure Test). 
15 Melaney Partner, acting director of the IRS’ Exempt Organizations Customer Education 
and Outreach office, concludes that the Substantial Part Test option is a “more subjective 
method compared to the more mathematical, objective expenditure test.” How to Lose Your 
501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status (Without Really Trying), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/how_to_lose_your_tax_exempt_status.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
Under this test, whether an organization’s activities are “substantial part” of its overall activities 
is determined by taking into account “all of the pertinent facts and circumstances.” Id. 
16 See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 
(10th Cir. 1972) (noting that the “political activities of an organization must be balanced . . . to 
determine whether a substantial part of its activities” consisted of lobbying).  
17 See Laura Brown Chisolm, Political Advocacy Meets the Internal Revenue Code: 
“There’s Got to Be a Better Way” 16 (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at N.Y.U. 
National Center on Philanthropy & Law Conference on Nonprofit Speech: Lobbying & Political 
Campaign Activities), available at 
http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/1994/COnf1994Chisolmpaper.pdf (noting the “imprecise 
and inconsistent interpretation by the I.R.S. and the courts” of the substantial part test).  
18 One court held that devoting less than 5 percent of an organization’s “time and effort” 
to lobbying is insubstantial. Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955). 
19 Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
20 See Chisolm, supra note 17, at 16–17 (noting various approaches to measuring the 
substantiality of an organization’s lobbying). 
 5/16/2012 12:43:26 PM 
762 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 
severity of its penalty.
21
 Furthermore, the lack of clarity in the 
Substantial Part Test may actually provide flexibility for charities not 
interested in compliance to circumvent limitations on lobbying. The 
Subcommittee on Oversight suggested in 1987 that “the opportunities 
for some exempt organizations to circumvent the law today are too 
numerous.”22 It said of the Substantial Part Test: 
[T]he penalty that generally exists for violation of these rules 
and restrictions by a tax-exempt organization, i.e., revocation 
of an organization’s tax-exempt status, is often inappropriate 
and ineffective and can have little deterrent effect. For those 
organizations deeply concerned about being in complete 
compliance of the law, the lack of clear guidelines coupled 
with the threat of the revocation sanction may inhibit many 
organizations from engaging in even permissible activities.
23
 
As the two men with primary responsibility for drafting and 
reviewing the 1988 Treasury regulations promulgated under section 
501(h) surmised, “the Subcommittee found that the statutory and 
regulatory provisions governing lobbying by charities fail to deter 
abusers, but do deter nonabusers.”24 Both Congress and Treasury 
evidently were aware of the shortcomings of the Substantial Part Test 
and its negative impact on the voice of the charitable sector. 
A. What We Can Surmise from the Legislative History 
The Substantial Part Test was added to the Code in 1934.
25
 The 
rationale for its introduction is unclear, and the legislative history is 
                                                                                                                 
21 See Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the 
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 244–246 (1987) (arguing that the level of under-guided IRS 
discretion to impose sanctions is inappropriate and creates the potential for abuse as a political 
tool); see generally Richard L. Haight, Lobbying for the Public Good: Limitations on 
Legislative Activities by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 77 (1987) 
(analyzing the limitations on lobbying, their imprecisions, and the resulting penalties, and 
suggesting a cautious approach to lobbying activities); see also S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 47 
(1969) (noting that “the standards as to the permissible level of [lobbying] activities under 
present law are so vague as to encourage subjective application of the sanction”).  
22 Findings And Recommendations Of Ways And Means Oversight Subcommittee On 
Federal Tax Rules Governing Lobbying, Political Activities, Submitted To Way And Means 
Committee, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 111, at J–21 (June 11, 1987). 
23 Id.  
24 Paul G. Accettura et al., The Revised Lobbying Regulations—A Difficult Balance, 41 
TAX NOTES 1425, 1434 (1988). The authors of this paper are James J. McGovern, the Assistant 
Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations), Office of Chief Counsel, 
Internal Revenue Service, Paul G. Accettura, an Assistant Branch Chief, and Jerome P. Walsh 
Skelly, a senior attorney, in 1987. Id. at 1425.  
25 Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–216, § 23(o), 48 Stat. 680, 690 (1934). 
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sparse.
26
 Both the available legislative history and its sparseness, 
however, may be instructive as to congressional intent.
27
 
There appears to have been little initial controversy among Senate 
Finance Committee members when the idea of limiting the ability of 
charities to lobby was first introduced at a committee meeting on 
March 21, 1934. In contrast to many of the other motions passed that 
day, Committee Chairman Pat Harrison’s motion that, “no deductions 
from gross income should be allowed in the case of contributions 
made to organizations carrying on propaganda, attempting to 
influence legislation or participating in partisan politics” passed 
without requiring even a “record vote” and was not debated.28 This 
apparent ease of passage is particularly noteworthy because the 
motion appears far broader than the eventual codified language.
29
 
Harrison’s motion seems to imply that there would be no deduction 
for an organization “carrying on” any lobbying activities.30  
The gap in the legislative history between introduction and vote is 
somewhat surprising. By the time the amendment had been submitted 
to the entire House of Representatives on April 2, 1934, language 
specifying that disqualification would occur only where a “substantial 
part” of an organization’s activities were lobbying-related had been 
added to the amendment.
31
 Senator Harrison may not, however, have 
considered this language significant to his motion in committee, as he 
introduced a large group of the Finance Committee’s amendments on 
the floor (including the new “no substantial part” language) by stating 
that “there are many amendments which it seems to me we can 
dispose of this afternoon as to which there is no controversy.”32 
Senator David Reed, another member of the Senate Finance 
Committee,
33
 however, either had registered some dissent in 
committee that is not noted in the minutes or had a change of heart 
between the committee’s vote and the amendment’s introduction on 
the floor, as he created the controversy that Harrison did not 
                                                                                                                 
26 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 500 (2008) (noting the “very limited” legislative history). 
27 Much of the legislative history summary derives from an excellent memorandum on the 
topic prepared by research assistant Daniel Schumeister in the summer of 2010. 
28 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 73RD CONG., MINUTES ON REVENUE ACT OF 1934 
110, 112 (March 21, 1934).  
29 See Revenue Act of 1934 § 23(o) (prohibiting lobbying only when it becomes a 
substantial part of an organization’s activities). 
30 See MINUTES ON REVENUE ACT OF 1934, supra note 28, at 112.  
31 See 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (showing the introduction of the amendment).  
32 Id. at 5860 (statement of Sen. Harrison). 
33 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 500 (noting that Senator Reed was the “ranking member 
of the Senate Finance Committee”). 
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anticipate.
34
 According to Harrison’s initial explanation on the floor, 
the amendment was to “apply to any organization that is receiving 
contributions, the proceeds of which are to be used for propaganda 
purposes or to try to influence legislation.”35 Senator Reed agreed 
with Harrison’s assessment of the bill’s purpose and claimed that the 
amendment fought against “selfish” donations to organizations that 
were advancing the “personal interests” of the donor.36 Yet, even at 
this early stage—during the initial floor debates—the difficulty in 
adequately defining “substantial part” became clear, as Reed noted 
that the amendment’s language was too broad, going “much further 
than the committee intended to go.”37  
Upon reconsideration of the amendment two days later, the 
congressmen and draftsmen were unable to formulate any more 
accurate language to accomplish the “impossible task”38 of wording 
the amendment.
39
 Reed again expressed his dismay at the 
amendment’s language, claiming that neither the Senate Finance 
Committee nor the “drafting counsel” was satisfied with the end 
product.
40
 Both Couzens and Reed agreed that the language could be 
changed in the Conference Committee.
41
 In the end, however, the 
“substantial part” language of the amendment did not change in 
conference aside from removing “participation in partisan politics” as 
a category of restricted action.
42
 Nor does any alternative to the 
“substantial part” language appear in the conference report.43  
Analysis of the limited legislative history can lead us to some 
concrete conclusions. Given that some legislative activity is permitted 
under the Substantial Part Test, Congress must have concluded that 
                                                                                                                 
34 His vacillations may have had to do with a personal feud with the National Economy 
League, a non-profit. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and 
Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related 
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2003) (chronicling Senator Reed’s feud with the National 
Economy League). 
35 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Harrison). 
36 Id. (statement of Sen. Reed). 
37 Id. Foreshadowing the decades of uncertainty to follow, Senator Couzens asked 
whether various types of organizations would pass the test. Id. Reed simply responded that he 
was “not so sure.” Id. The amendment was then passed over for later discussion. Id. 
38 Id. (statement of Sen. Reed). 
39 See 78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934) (acknowledging the remaining imprecision and 
potential and the likely need for further revision). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity, and Tax 
Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 381 (2007) (quoting Lobbying and Political Activities 
of Tax-Exempt Orgs.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 100th Cong. 124, 139 (1987) (statement of William J. Lehrfeld)). 
43 DOUGHTON, TO PROVIDE REVENUE, EQUALIZE TAXATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 
H.R. Rep. No. 73–1385, at 3–4 (1934). 
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lobbying by charities can produce public benefit. A journey deeper 
into the scarce legislative history confirms that Congress did not 
believe that legislative activity could not co-exist with charitable 
purpose, since Congress did not ban lobbying by charities 
altogether.
44
 The “no substantial part” language was added to the 
Code in the Revenue Act of 1934, without congressional hearings on 
the topic.
45
  
According to floor statements by one Senator, the intent in adding 
the “substantial part” language to section 501(c)(3) was to deny a 
deduction for contributions that were used to influence legislation 
because such contributions were “selfish” and “made to advance the 
personal interests of the giver of the money.”46 No additional 
illumination of the Substantial Part Test can be derived from the 
legislative history to the Revenue Act of 1934, leading us to deduce 
only that Congress concluded (1) some legislative activity can co-
exist with and further the exempt purposes of a public charity,
47
 (2) 
“selfish” lobbying (i.e., lobbying that promotes the individual 
interests of its leaders rather than the interests of the public it serves) 
could not further the exempt purposes of a public charity, and (3) 
charities should be permitted to engage in non-selfish legislative 
activity to further their charitable purposes. There is no indication, 
however, as to why that non-selfish legislative activity should be 
restricted or limited in any way. Congress’s goals might have been 
better achieved by proscribing “selfish” lobbying but allowing 
unlimited non-selfish legislative activity by charities.
48
  
The history of the 1934 legislation does not support any sort of 
limitation on non-selfish lobbying by public charities. Furthermore, 
there are other sorts of checks on the activities of public charities that 
make selfish lobbying unlikely. For example, the inurement and 
private benefit restrictions would provide sufficient penalty to quell 
lobbying that might benefit personally those in charge of the 
                                                                                                                 
44 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 500 (concluding that Congress believed lobbying by 
charities should be restricted to prevent abuses, not prohibited outright). 
45 See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–216, § 101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 700 (1934). The 
provision was enacted as part of the Supplemental Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934.  
46 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed). Senator Byron P. Harrison noted 
that “there are certain organizations which are receiving contributions in order to influence 
legislation and carry out propaganda. The committee thought there ought to be an amendment 
which would stop that, so that is why we have put this amendment in the bill.” Id. at 5959 
(statement of Sen. Harrison). 
47 See also Revenue Act of 1934: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1934). 
48 Arguably Congress did this in 1969 when it enacted section 4945, which effectively 
prohibits private foundations from lobbying, although some would argue that they have gone 
too far. See discussion regarding private foundations infra Part IV.A.1. 
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organization.
49
 In addition, the requirement that charities be 
“organized and operated exclusively” for certain charitable purposes50 
precludes substantial lobbying that does not support those purposes. 
More effective, perhaps, are the strictures imposed by the public 
accountability of the charities. In other words, public charities are 
dependent on the public and government for funding and support.
51
 If 
their legislative activities do not further the public purposes supported 
by their funders and the purchasers of their goods and services, they 
will lose support and suffer economic, reputational, and other 
consequences.
52
 This reliance on the public decreases the risk that 
public charities will engage in selfish lobbying, further indicating that 
                                                                                                                 
49 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(2)–(3) (as amended in 2008); 
see also Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 745–46 (2007) (discussing the difference between the private benefit 
and private inurement restrictions).  
50 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1), provide that, in order to 
be exempt, an organization must engage “primarily in activities which accomplish one or more 
of . . . exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” (emphasis added). 
51 Although from 1950 onwards there developed a trend of deepening distrust of private 
foundations, a 1965 Treasury report illuminated many of the positive aspects of private 
foundations:  
Private philanthropic organizations can possess important characteristics which 
modern government necessarily lacks. They may be many-centered, free of 
administrative superstructure, subject to the readily exercised control of individuals 
with widely diversified views and interests. Such characteristics give these 
organizations great opportunity to initiate thought and action, to experiment with 
new and untried ventures, to dissent from prevailing attitudes, and to act quickly and 
flexibly. Precisely because they can be initiated and controlled by a single person or 
a small group, they may evoke great intensity of interest and dedication of energy. 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89th CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON 
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 12 (Comm. Print 1965). This report also identified a limited number of 
instances in which private foundations engaged in self-dealing. Id. at 15–23. Congress seems to 
have latched on to the more negative aspects of the report, and using the report as evidence of 
the potential and actual problems with private foundations, enacted greater restrictions on 
private foundations in 1969. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE 
TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 51 
(1970) (discussing the additional requirements for private foundations); 115 CONG. REC. 
37,197–204 (1969) (hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969) (noting the abuses of private 
foundations) ; H.R. Rep. No. 91–418, pt. 1, at 19 (1969) (discussing the creation of a minimal 
tax on the investment income of private foundations, in part, because of the perceived need for 
“vigorous and extensive administration . . . in order to provide appropriate assurances that 
private foundations will promptly and properly use their funds for charitable purposes”); see 
generally Leif M. Clark, Comment, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 
HOUS. L. REV. 480 (1979) (examining the rationale and application of the political activities 
limitation as applied to churches). 
52 Both United Way and the Red Cross have seen contributions drop following scandals. 
See Robert Strauss, Accountability; They’re Mad as Hell, and They’re Not Making Donations 
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/17/giving/accountability-they-re-mad-as-hell-and-they-re-not-
making-donations-anymore.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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the restrictions on lobbying for public charities are unnecessary and 
ill-advised. 
B. IRS and Treasury Illumination 
Given the vagueness of the Substantial Part Test and the severity 
of the penalty for failing it, one would expect Treasury or the IRS to 
provide some helpful direction. IRS and Treasury guidance, however, 
has been relatively ineffective in providing a roadmap for compliance 
with the Substantial Part Test. 
According to the IRS, the Substantial Part Test is one “determined 
on the basis of all the pertinent facts and circumstances in each 
case.”53 The IRS has held that an organization whose “primary 
objective” can only be accomplished through lobbying would not be 
eligible for 501(c)(3) status.
54
 Nonetheless, this statement provides no 
guidance in determining what part of an organization’s activities 
would constitute a “substantial part” or which factors to weigh in 
making the determination. The line remains blurry and perplexing. 
Treasury regulations defining “action organizations”55 for purposes 
of the operational test lead us to a similarly mystifying place. An 
“action organization” is not “operated exclusively” for exempt 
purposes,
56
 but the definition of “action organization” is anything but 
clear. “Action organization” is defined in two, equally unhelpful 
ways, both of which require line drawing without a legislative or 
regulatory ruler. To determine whether an organization falls within 
the definition we must determine either (1) that a “substantial part of 
its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or 
                                                                                                                 
53 Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=163393,00.html (last updated July 20, 2011). The 
Exempt Organizations Handbook, explains the “no substantial part” test: 
[T]here is no simple rule as to what amount of activities is substantial . . . . Most 
cases have tended to avoid any attempt at percentage measurement of activities . . . . 
The central problem is more often one of characterizing the various attempts to 
influence legislation. Once this determination is made, substantiality is frequently 
self-evident. 
Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4. Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) § 394 [hereinafter 
Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test]. 
54 See Rev. Rul. 62–71, 1962–1 C.B. 85 (holding that an organization primarily engaged 
in teaching and advocating the adoption of a particular real estate taxation theory did not qualify 
for 501(c)(3) exemption because it was an action organization, i.e., its primary objective could 
only be accomplished by the enactment of legislation); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–
1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008) (defining “action” organizations, which are by definition not 
operated exclusively for exempt purposes). 
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3). This regulation states, in part, that “An organization 
is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if it is an action organization . . . .” 
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i). 
56 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i). 
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otherwise,”57 or (2) “its main or primary objective or objectives . . . 
may be attained only by legislation or a defeat of proposed 
legislation.”58 For the second test, the regulations suggest considering 
“all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the articles 
and all activities of the organization . . . .”59 Nowhere in these two 
tests does Treasury provide guidance on which measurements to use 
or which factors to weigh in making a determination. As one 
commentator explains, “it is unclear whether this determination is 
based on the level of activity measured, for example, by time spent, or 
expenditures, or both. In addition, there is no guidance as to how 
much activity, however computed, constitutes a substantial part of the 
organization’s activities.”60 
The lack of effective guidance from IRS and Treasury, combined 
with the threat of loss of exemption for crossing an invisible line, 
inevitably scares many charities into inactivity in the realm of 
legislative matters. It is hard to imagine, from available legislative 
history, that Congress ever intended this result. 
C. Hints from the Courts 
Just as there is little in the way of guidance from the legislative 
history, the IRS, and Treasury, the judicial record in interpreting the 
“substantial part” test is remarkably vague.61 Indeed, only four or five 
cases generally are cited in interpreting the test.
62
 Furthermore, as has 
been widely noted, the existing case law reveals anything but a clear, 
predictable doctrine surrounding the Substantial Part Test; just the 
opposite is true. In 1955, the Sixth Circuit held, in Seasongood v. 
Commissioner,
63
 that 5 percent of an organization’s expenditures did 
not reach the level of “substantial” and reversed the IRS’s revocation 
of an organization’s 501(c)(3) status.64 In Christian Echoes National 
                                                                                                                 
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(ii). 
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iv). 
59 Id. 
60 FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 
5.03[3] (2005).  
61 See id. (observing that the limited judicial precedents “do not resolve most of the 
significant issues”). 
62 See id. (analyzing the four commonly cited cases addressing the “substantial part” test); 
Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 370, 372 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/lawreview/Colloquy/2009/10 (discussing the unclear 
case law in this area); Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the 
Internal Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1279 n.25 
(1993) (same); see generally Chisolm, supra note 17 (generally discussing the imprecision of 
the law and cases addressing this area of law).  
63 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955). 
64 Id. at 912. But see Lord’s Day Alliance of Pa. v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D. 
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Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
65
 the Tenth Circuit declined to follow 
the developing certainty of the Sixth Circuit’s “percentage test,” and, 
instead, balanced “the political activities of the organization” within 
“the context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization,” 
upholding a revocation of exemption for this and other reasons.
66
 In 
League of Women Voters of United States v. United States,
67
 the 
Court of Claims focused only on the amount of time the 
organization’s staff spent on lobbying activities in reaching its 
conclusion.
68
 Finally, in 1975 in Haswell v. United States,
69
 the Court 
of Claims attempted to find a middle ground between the objective 
numbers of a percentage-based test and the subjectivity of a 
“significance of activities test,” noting both the organization’s 
percentage of expenditures spent on lobbying as well as the relative 
primacy of lobbying to the organization’s activities.70 Unfortunately, 
the court did not explain how it arrived at its determination of the 
significance of the organization’s lobbying activities, nor has that 
court, or any court, considered a “substantial part” test claim since 
then.
71
  
In essence, courts have applied a moving-target approach to both 
critical definitions and the measuring rods for substantiality of 
legislative activity. This judicial inconsistency leaves the charitable 
sector with no notion of either what constitutes substantial legislative 
activity or which factors to weigh in measuring substantiality. Given 
the severity of the penalty (loss of exemptions) for foot-faults over an 
invisible and unidentifiable line, the response of inaction in the realm 
of legislative activities is predictable.  
II. THE EXPENDITURE TEST 
In 1976, Congress enacted section 501(h), which established an 
elective standard for determining whether a public charity’s 
legislative activities qualify as insubstantial.
72
 Section 501(h) is an 
                                                                                                                 
 
Pa. 1946) (holding that the legislative activities were “minor” because the activities “occurred 
only when the Legislature was in session, four or five months biennially”). 
65 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).  
66 Id. at 855; see also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 60 § 5.03[3] (discussing the 
significance of the Christian Echoes holding). 
67 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960). 
68 Id. at 383 (holding that lobbying was the main reason for the League’s formation). 
69 500 F.2d 1133. 
70 Id. at 1145–47 (dismissing the plaintiff’s case based on its finding of fact that the 
organization’s activities were political in nature). 
71 See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 60 § 5.03[3] (“It is unclear how the court determined 
the extent of the organization’s activities.”). 
72 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1520, 1720 (1976).  
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elective safe harbor provision. Specifically, it provides an election for 
certain 501(c)(3) organizations
73
 that permits them to engage in 
legislative activity up to statutorily specified limits, which are 
expressed solely in terms of dollar amounts.
74
 Section 501(h) permits 
eligible organizations to elect the Expenditure Test as a substitute for 
the Substantial Part Test, making the Substantial Part Test, in effect, 
the default test for measuring lobbying activities. 
Unlike the subjective Substantial Part Test, the Expenditure Test is 
quite objective. It draws vivid lines for charitable lobbying framed 
entirely in terms of dollar amounts.
75
 Charities electing the 
Expenditure Test to delineate their lobbying limitations are able to 
pinpoint precisely how much they can spend on various types of 
communications intended to impact legislation without incurring 
either an intermediate or the ultimate sanction. Furthermore, 
significant terms and concepts that remained undefined and 
inconsistently interpreted under the Substantial Part Test are now 
clearly defined by statute and in Treasury regulations.
76
 
A. Legislative History 
The Expenditure Test is best viewed as a legislative fix to the 
vagueness of the Substantial Part Test. Legislative history to the 1976 
Act, while not abundant, is more robust and clarifying than the 
discussion surrounding the addition of the “substantial part” language 
to the Code in 1934. The legislative history from 1976
77
 indicates five 
primary purposes for the enactment of the Expenditure Test. First, 
section 501(h) was intended to eliminate the vagueness of the 
Substantial Part Test by defining substantiality in objective terms.
78
 
Second, the provision addressed the concern that large organizations 
would be less restricted than small organizations by the Substantial 
Part Test and thus able to lobby more extensively than smaller 
organizations because the larger organizations could afford to form 
                                                                                                                 
73 All public charities other than private foundations and churches may make the election. 
I.R.C. § 501(h)(3)–(5) (2006).  
74 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(2) (establishing dollar value ceilings on “lobbying expenditures” 
and “grass roots expenditures”); I.R.C. § 4911 (imposing tax on charities that make excessive 
expenditures to affect legislation).  
75 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(2). 
76 The helpful terms and concepts adopted for the Expenditure Test explicitly do not apply 
to the Substantial Part Test. I.R.C. § 501(h)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)–1(a)(4). 
77 Special thanks to research assistant Daniel Schumeister for his thorough review of this 
legislative history. Much of the analysis is based on his description of this history in a memo 
dated August 20, 2010. 
78 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (1976) (noting that the addition of 501(h) was 
“designed to set relatively specific expenditure limits to replace the uncertain standards of 
present law ”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 80 (1976) (same). 
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and fund organizations described in section 501(c)(4) that could lobby 
extensively or even exclusively.
79
 Third, Congress appeared to be 
concerned about the harshness of the ultimate sanction of loss of 
exemption as the penalty for violating the vague Substantial Part Test, 
particularly in light of the potentially greater risk of confronting that 
penalty for smaller organizations.
80
 Responding to this concern, 
section 4911 provides for an intermediate sanction in lieu of and in 
addition to an ultimate sanction for excessive lobbying expenditures 
under the Expenditure Test.
81
 Fourth, the House Report indicated that 
a more objective and clearly defined standard would enable the 
Service to more properly enforce the limitation on legislative 
activities imposed under section 501(c)(3).
82
 Fifth, Congress was 
interested in creating parity in the Code between the nonprofit sector 
and the for-profit sector in access to Congress.
83
 As made clear by an 
American Bar Association Report, legislators “need information” 
from the nonprofit lobby just as they need it from the business sector, 
and the Expenditure Test would tend to restore the balance between 
for-profit and non-profit lobbying influence.
84
  
The path to the addition of section 501(h) to the Code was a long 
and winding road through a stop-and-start maze. The bill that 
ultimately passed, H.R. 13500, was the product of a 1968 ABA 
report, nine different legislative proposals over a six year period, and 
attention by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs, known as the Filer Commission, after its chair, John H. Filer.
85
 
                                                                                                                 
79 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (“Some organizations (particularly organizations 
which have already built up large endowments) can split up their activities between a lobbying 
organization and a charitable organization.”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 80 (same). 
Organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are exempt from federal income tax under I.R.C. § 
501(a) and are operated for the promotion of social welfare. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4). A 501(c)(4) 
organization may further its purposes through lobbying as its primary or only activity without 
jeopardizing its exempt status but is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under 
I.R.C. § 170(c). I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(4). 
80 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (citing concern that smaller organizations 
incapable of splitting their activities between lobbying and charitable organizations, loss of 
501(c)(3) status would constitute a “severe blow to the organization”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 
2, at 80 (same); see, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 
856 (1972) (revoking 501(c)(3) status of a religious organization engaged in lobbying activities 
under the substantial part test). 
81 See I.R.C. § 4911 (imposing a tax on excess lobbying expenditures). 
82 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, at 8. 
83 See Influencing Legislation by Public Charities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means on H.R. 13500, 94th Cong. 65 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 13500] 
(statement of Sherwin P. Simmons, President, American Bar Association) (presenting the ABA 
view that charities “should be permitted to communicate directly with legislative bodies”). 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 37–38 (discussing the history of H.R. 13,500 and referencing the findings of 
the Filer Commission). The Filer Commission ultimately recommended that the lobbying 
restrictions of section 501 should replicate those of section 162, stating that “nonprofit 
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H.R. 13500 clearly was not a bill that simply slipped through the halls 
of Congress and on to the President’s desk. Appropriately describing 
an earlier bill,
86
 the lawyers at Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz 
characterized the effort as one that “represents a compromise on a 
compromise on a compromise on a compromise . . . .”87 Considering 
that H.R. 13500 was the product of at least three more proposals and 
two more years of compromise and discussion after those 
compromises, the complexity of H.R. 13500’s passage is hard to 
overstate. 
A review of the legislative history indicates that the 1976 changes 
in the Code were intended to encourage greater lobbying by the 
nonprofit sector. The evidence also strongly suggests that the interests 
of Congress and the independent sector were, in general, aligned in 
moving towards a new lobbying rule, although each group had 
distinct views on which reforms were necessary.  
In 1969, Senator John Sherman Cooper made the first move in 
Congress, as he introduced an amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 
1969
88
 following up on the ABA Resolution from earlier that year.
89
 
Senator Cooper argued that Congress needed to ensure that it received 
a “flow of information of the highest quality,” stating that “Senators 
and Representatives can act wisely only if all sides of the issue are 
aired before them.”90 Cooper, therefore, proposed to allow unlimited 
lobbying, explicitly attempting to keep the tax treatment of nonprofits 
in line with that of for-profit entities. He found it “disturbing” that 
while 501(c)(3)’s lobbying activities were heavily restricted, other 
Code sections provided a “tax stimulus” to for-profit businesses that 
lobby by permitting them to deduct lobbying expenses.
91
 Notably, 
however, Cooper would have forbidden all grassroots lobbying, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
organizations, other than foundations, [should] be allowed the same freedoms to attempt to 
influence legislation as are business corporations and trade associations, that toward this end 
Congress remove the current limitation on such activity by charitable groups eligible to receive 
tax-deductible gifts.” COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN 
AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 181 (1975) (emphasis removed). 
86 H.R. 12037, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. 1973). 
87 Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, Legislative Activities of Charitable Organizations Other 
Than Private Foundations, with Addendum on Legislative Activities of Private Foundations, in 
5 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND 
PUBLIC NEEDS, 2917, 2928 (1977) [hereinafter Pepper, Hamilton Report]. 
88 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong. (1st Sess. 1969). 
89 See Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37 (noting the introduction of the ABA 
resolution).  
90 115 CONG. REC. 29,426 (1969) (statement of Rep. John Cooper).  
91 Id. This is no longer the case under current law. I.R.C. § 162(e). 
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any attempts “to influence the general public or segments thereof with 
respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums.”92 
Two years later, Senator Edmund Muskie
93
 and Congressman 
James Symington
94
 simultaneously introduced bills devoted to 
lobbying reform. Similar to Cooper’s amendment, the Muskie-
Symington bill was designed to provide parity between the treatment 
of lobbying as provided by section 501(c)(3) and section 162.
95
 
Introducing the bill, Muskie reiterated the desire for increased 
nonprofit participation in the legislative process, claiming that it 
“makes no sense to decide” that organizations operate in the public 
interest and thus “grant them tax-exempt status” yet still “silence 
them when they attempt to speak to those whom must decide public 
policy.”96 Indeed, Senator Muskie noted, “[i]t is fundamental to our 
constitutional system that they should have equal access along with 
business groups and others in presenting views to Congress.”97 
Muskie’s proposal, however, was not intended to permit unlimited 
legislative activity by charities: only lobbying pertaining to 
“legislation of direct interest to the organization” would be permitted, 
and, as with Cooper’s proposal, grassroots lobbying would be 
disallowed.
98
 Although there was “broad support” for the bill, “there 
was some concern that it was too broad and that it might be 
interpreted” to allow charities to focus on lobbying rather than other 
“normal operations.”99 This attempt did not result in law. 
Next, Senator Muskie and Senator Hugh Scott introduced a bill
100
 
“which had the same fundamental purpose but somewhat limited the 
legislative activities in which charities might engage.”101 According to 
attorneys at Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, the Muskie-Scott bills 
limited legislative activities such that a 501(c)(3) organization had to 
“‘normally’” devote “‘substantially more than one-half’” of its budget 
to the function for which its exemption was granted.
102
 Though this 
language sounds perilously similar to the vague “substantial part” 
                                                                                                                 
92 Id. at 29,427 (quotation omitted). Cooper would also have retained the prohibition on 
involvement in political campaigns. Id. 
93 S. 1408, 92d Cong. (1971). 
94 H.R. 8920, 92d Cong. (1971). 
95 See Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37 (observing that the Muskie-
Symington bills followed the characteristics of section 162(e)). 
96 117 CONG. REC. 8517 (1971). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 8518.  
99 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37. 
100 S. 3063, 92d Cong. (1972). 
101 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37. 
102 See Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2926 (quoting S. 3063, 92d Cong. § 
3(B) (1972)). 
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terminology, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 intended to define 
“normally” and “substantially more than one-half.”103 
Next up was the Ullman-Schneebeli bill of March 9, 1972,
104
 an 
effort that represented “[f]urther compromise and refinement.”105 The 
Ullman-Schneebeli bill marked the first time a reform proposal 
allowed for some amount of grassroots lobbying, and also held that 
communication between an organization and its members intended to 
spur those members to influence legislation would count towards the 
organization’s lobbying quota.106 The bill also presaged H.R. 13500’s 
use of an expenditure test that provided more stringent regulation of 
grassroots lobbying than direct lobbying; it provided that while a 
nonprofit could use 20 percent of its expenditures for general 
lobbying, only 5 percent of total expenditures could be used for 
grassroots lobbying.
107
 The Ullman-Schneebeli bill also for the first 
time excluded certain types of legislative activity from the definition 
of restricted lobbying, such as nonpartisan research, requested 
technical assistance, and appearances directly related to the viability 
of an organization’s tax-exempt status.108 This bill bears closer 
resemblance to the legislation ultimately passed than earlier versions, 
but a long road to passage still remained. 
The Ullman-Schneebeli bill garnered “overwhelmingly favorable” 
testimony during May 1972 hearings, but Treasury remained unhappy 
with several of its provisions.
109
 Before the Ways and Means 
Committee, Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax 
Policy, indicated Treasury’s interest in modeling the new legislation 
directly on section 162(e)’s allowable business deductions, and 
permitting charity lobbying for matters “of direct interest.”110 Among 
other hesitations, Cohen expressed concern that the limitations 
provided by the Ullman-Schneebeli bill would allow “at least $1.5 
billion [to] be expended on ‘grassroots’ lobbying.”111 Treasury 
                                                                                                                 
103 Id.  
104 H.R. 13720, 92d Cong. (1972). 
105 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37. See also Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra 
note 87, at 2926 (noting that the bill reflected “further compromise and considerable 
refinement”). 
106 See Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2926 (“This bill not only permitted 
direct lobbying; it also permitted charities to undertake a limited amount of ‘grass roots’ 
activity.”). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 2926–27.  
109 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37.  
110 Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 13 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 13720] 
(statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy). 
111 Id. at 8. 
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believed organizations might develop large “slush funds.”112 The 
charities, however, favored the specificity of the Expenditure Test.
113
  
Next, competing bills were introduced in quick succession by 
Senators Muskie and Scott
114
 and by the Ullman-Schneebeli team.
115
 
The latter bill garnered more attention and support, as reported in the 
Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz report discussing the Ullman-Schneebeli 
bill: 
This bill made some dramatic changes. It adopted a reverse 
graduation feature to limit expenditures for direct lobbying. 
This feature responded to the “slush fund” argument. The bill 
then grouped all other lobbying activities together, thereby 
including grass-roots activities with activities involving 
communication between the organization and its members. 
The bill proscribed all but an “insignificant” amount of such 
activities. The bill also contained a penalty clause that in 
effect fined charitable organizations which undertook 
proscribed legislative activities in addition to revoking their 
preferred status under section 501(c)(3). This provision was 
inserted to protect against the possibility of a public charity 
losing its section 501(c)(3) status with a large endowment 
fund, created with tax-deductible dollars, that could then be 
expended without limitation on lobbying activities.
116
 
The independent sector was not, however, satisfied with this latest 
bill: nonprofits initially objected to the penalty clause and believed 
that by allowing only an “insignificant” amount of communication 
between organizations and their members that was deemed lobbying, 
                                                                                                                 
112 See Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927 (citation and quotation omitted).  
113 See id. (“The charitable organizations, on the other hand, supported the bill’s 
quantitative tests with its 20 percent – 5 percent feature. The tests were considerably more 
specific than the substantiality test and could be easily translated into dollars.”). 
114 S. 1036, 93d Cong. (1973). 
115 H.R. 5095, 93d Cong. (1973). 
116 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927 (footnotes omitted). The report 
continued:  
Another feature of the Ullman-Schneebeli bill was a new provision relating to affiliated 
organizations. This provision required that if two or more organizations are effectively 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same person or persons, one of which was a section 
501(c)(3) organization electing to have its lobbying activities regulated in accordance with the 
amendment, the two organizations would be treated as one and the same for purposes of the bill. 
Some such provision would appear to be required so long as a “reverse graduation” principle is 
used.  
The bill also had a provision relating to section 501(c)(4) organizations and a self-
terminating provision.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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“communication with their membership was effectively denied to 
them.” 117 Representative Barber Conable, a member of the Ways and 
Means Committee, reacted to the charities’ concern about member 
communications by introducing his own bill
118
 in December of 
1973.
119
 “The Conable bill retained most of the provisions of the 
second Ullman-Schneebeli bill, but excluded communications with 
members from the definition of influencing legislation, and deleted 
the penalty tax provision, the provision relating to section 501(c)(4) 
organizations, and the self-terminating provision.”120 
The Conable bill, upon its reintroduction in early 1974, was 
subject to significant discussion and amendment.
121
 The Ways and 
Means Committee adopted the bill, but changed three key provisions, 
including the penalty tax provision and the affiliation rules.
122
 By the 
time the Conable bill was ready to leave the committee, the changes 
led the Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz report to describe the final product 
as “difficult to compare” with prior versions.123 Notably, however, the 
committee’s effort marked the first use of the phrases “qualified 
lobbying amounts” and “exempt purpose expenditures,” both 
significant terms in the final rules adopted in H.R. 
13500.
124
Congressman Conable was not, however, happy with all of 
these changes to his bill, and as the congressional session was 
drawing to a close, he asked that it be withdrawn in its entirety.
125
  
Finally, in the second half of 1975 an agreeable solution was 
reached. In June, Congressman Conable introduced a second bill,
126
 
cosponsored by twenty-three members of the House Ways and Means 
Committee.
127
 In December, Senator Muskie, with eleven members—
approximately half
128
 of the Senate Finance Committee—offered an 
“identical” bill.129  
                                                                                                                 
117 Id. 
118 H.R. 12037, 93d Cong. (1973).  
119 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38.  
120 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927.  
121 See id. at 2928 (noting that the bill was a compromise between the different proposals). 
122 See id. (noting that “the proposed bill would accomplish a great deal. It would take care 
of the major concerns of the charities by allowing three things: 1. Definite provision with 
respect to direct lobbying. . . . 2. Freedom to communicate on proper subjects with bona fide 
members. . . . 3. Some residual protection for any combination of grass-roots lobbying and 
minor expenditures in any other area.”). 
123 Id.; see also Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting that “several changes 
of format and substance were made”). 
124 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2928 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 Id. 
126 H.R. 8021, 94th Cong. (1975).  
127 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38.  
128 Compare Membership of the Committee (By Congress and Session): Select Committee 
on Finance and an Uniform National Currency, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN., 
http://finance.senate.gov/download/?id=e4b3f33b-d064-4ab0-8959-2d00f518a9f8 (last visited 
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H.R. 13500, therefore, did not simply slip through the halls of 
Congress and on to the President’s desk. Describing Barber Conable’s 
earlier H.R. 12037, the lawyers at Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz 
characterized the effort as one that “represents a compromise on a 
compromise on a compromise on a compromise.”130 Considering, 
then, that H.R. 13500 was the product of at least three more proposals 
and two more years of compromise and discussion after the 
introduction of H.R. 12037, the complexity of the background to H.R. 
13500’s passage is hard to overstate.  
The detailed legislative history and the path of amendments over a 
six-year period and nine separate pieces of legislation sheds light on 
Congress’s intentions in providing an alternative for the Substantial 
Part Test. This history suggests that congressional action was 
significantly motivated by a desire to simplify and clarify the rules 
and definitions that restrict legislative activities by charities and to 
provide equal access to Congress for charities and business. 
Congress’s intent was not to prohibit lobbying by public charities, and 
the legislative history to the 1976 Act does not reflect concern that 
legislative activities are in some way incompatible with public 
purposes. Rather, Congress seemed to value and crave more rather 
than less input from the charitable sector on policy reform. Congress 
was concerned about the severity of the loss of exemption penalty for 
charities that crossed the undefined line of substantial lobbying. 
Reflecting this concern, Congress fashioned an intermediate sanction 
to make legislative activities less risky.  
Although initially concerned about charities lobbying the public 
(so called “grassroots” lobbying), Congress ultimately opted not to 
prohibit that activity, but rather to limit it out of some unidentified 
fear. Finally, although a regressive sliding scale that prefers smaller 
organizations over those with large budgets and endowments arose 
from the legislative dust, those regressive limits seem to stem more 
from compromise than from any overriding intent to generally limit 
legislative activity by public charities. Even more perplexing, in light 
of the legislative history, is the source and policy behind the 
particular limits that appeared in the enacted legislation. Although 
reasons for the regressivity of the formula were hinted at, no clues 
                                                                                                                 
 
Apr. 9, 2012) (showing the members of the 94th Senate Finance Committee as having eighteen 
members), with Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting that eleven members of 
the Senate Finance Committee joined cosponsored the bill). 
129 S. 2832, 94th Cong. (1975); see Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting 
that the bills were identical). 
130 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2928. 
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reflect a rationale for the limits selected or whether the limits were 
negotiated or well-vetted. The absence of any history regarding the 
selected limits, combined with clear history that demonstrates 
congressional intent to increase, rather than limit, legislative activity 
by public charities, suggests that the limits may not serve any 
identifiable policy purpose. 
B. How it Works 
As stated above, section 501(h) is essentially a safe harbor 
provision; it permits eligible organizations
131
 to elect the Expenditure 
Test as a substitute for the Substantial Part Test. The objective nature 
of the Expenditure Test makes it much more useful than the 
subjective Substantial Part Test for public charities wishing to impact 
public policy in a meaningful way. 
Two distinct issues arise in connection with section 501(h). First is 
the issue of excise tax liability for excessive lobbying activities in any 
given year. This does not necessarily lead to loss of exemption. The 
second issue is loss of exemption that may result from excessive 
lobbying activities that continue over a period of time. Specifically, 
unlike a finding that a “substantial part” of an organization’s activities 
consist of lobbying, breaching the concrete ceilings provided by the 
Expenditure Test in one year will not result in a revocation of 
501(c)(3) status. Rather, exceeding the limitations provided by 
section 4911 in any year will result in a 25 percent excise or penalty 
tax on excess expenditures, and only after an organization has been 
found to “normally” exceed the limits—that is, after it has exceeded 
the stated ceilings
132
 over a “four-year period”—will the organization 
risk loss of its exempt status.
133
 
The precise mechanics of sections 501(h) and 4911 are complex,
134
 
and this Article does not intend to summarize the law, but a few 
points should be mentioned. A charity with a section 501(h) election 
in effect is permitted to spend a fixed amount on overall lobbying and 
a smaller fixed amount on grassroots lobbying.
135
 The amount that a 
                                                                                                                 
131 See I.R.C § 501(h)(5) (2006) (providing that eligible organizations are electing public 
charities other than churches and certain affiliated entities and organizations of churches and 
private foundations, which are not eligible to make the § 501(h) election). 
132 These ceilings are referred to as the “Lobbying Ceiling Amount” and the “Grass Roots 
Ceiling Amount.” 
133 See Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, supra note 53.  
134 I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 4911; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(h), 56.4911 (1990). For further 
information on the mechanics of the code, see generally JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN 
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 5 (3d ed. 2006), Mayer, 
supra note 26, at 494–501, and Chisolm, supra note 17, at 11–40. 
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)–3.  
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charity may spend without penalty (i.e., the “Lobbying Nontaxable 
Amount” and the “Grassroots Nontaxable Amount”) is defined as a 
percentage of the charity’s exempt purpose expenditures.136 Exempt 
purpose expenditures, as the words suggest, are the amounts treated 
under the Code and regulations as being spent by an organization to 
further its exempt purpose.
137
 In effect, the exempt purpose 
expenditure of an organization is the “overall measuring rod against 
which an organization’s lobbying expenses are tested.”138 Lobbying 
expenditures are expenditures made in connection with influencing 
legislation, as that term is defined in section 4911(d), and are 
classified as either direct lobbying expenditures or grassroots 
expenditures.
139
 Grassroots expenditures, used to produce 
communications intended to influence the public, are subject to a 
stricter cap
140
 and therefore more limited than direct lobbying 
expenditures, for purposes of imposing both the intermediate sanction 
and the ultimate sanction of loss of exemption. 
The Lobbying Nontaxable Amount and the Grassroots Nontaxable 
Amount, and, therefore, the Lobbying Ceiling Amount and the 
Grassroots Ceiling Amount, are determined based on regressive 
sliding scales. The maximum nontaxable and ceiling amounts kick in 
when an organization’s exempt purpose expenditures reach $17 
million for a given year.
141
 As a result, organizations with large 
budgets and endowments are more restricted than their smaller 
counterparts, and larger organizations may be permitted to engage in 
                                                                                                                 
136 Id.; I.R.C. § 4911(c). 
137 I.R.C. § 4911(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–4.  
138 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 134, at 524. 
139 “Influencing legislation” means any attempt to influence any legislation (A) “through 
an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof” (i.e., grassroots 
lobbying), or (B) “through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, 
or with any government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of the 
legislation” (i.e., direct lobbying). I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1). There are some important exceptions to 
this definition, including (1) “making available the results to nonpartisan analysis, study, or 
research,” (2) “providing technical advice or assistance . . . to a governmental body . . . [at the 
request of] such body,” and (3) certain communications with members. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2); see 
also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(c) (providing a detailed explanation of the exceptions). 
140 The grassroots nontaxable amount for any year is limited to 25 percent of the lobbying 
nontaxable amount for that year. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4). See also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–3 
(providing further detail as to the definition of direct lobbying and grassroots communications). 
141 I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (providing that the maximum lobbying nontaxable amount is the 
lesser of $1,000,000 or, where exempt purpose expenditures exceed $1,500,000, $225,000 plus 
5 percent of the excess of exempt purpose expenditures over $1,500,000, which equates to a 
$17,000,000 cap for exempt purpose expenditures that can be used to increase an organization’s 
nontaxable amount ($15,500,000 multiplied by 5 percent equals $775,000, which added to the 
$225,000 from the initial $1,500,000 totals $1,000,000, i.e., the maximum lobbying nontaxable 
amount)); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–1(c)(1)(ii). 
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more legislative activity under the Substantial Part Test than under 
the Expenditure Test. 
C. Benefits of the Expenditure Test 
The primary benefit of the Expenditure Test is clarity—both 
clarity as to what an organization can spend and as to what it can 
spend on. A safe harbor with bright line limitations should appeal to 
charities. It is therefore curious that less than 2 percent of eligible 
charities have actually made the election, and that the percentage of 
eligible organizations making the election has barely increased over 
the past two decades. As of 1989, only an estimated 1 percent of 
eligible organizations had taken advantage of the 501(h) election.
142
 
In 1993, Miriam Galston intuitively argued that this minimal appeal 
could be attributed to the fact that final Treasury regulations were not 
codified until 1990 and that the certainty of the finalized regulations 
would lead to a greater proportion of eligible organizations making 
the election in the future.
143
 Similarly, Professor Laura Chisolm 
predicted in 1994, that: 
it seems almost inevitable that the carefully crafted and 
highly workable standards of the 1990 regulations will, over 
time, become the measuring rod against which the activities 
of public charities that engage in issue advocacy will be 
evaluated. With detailed standards in place for electing 
organizations, it becomes harder to imagine Service or court 
decisions resting on an unmodified, know-it when-we-see-it 
approach, even if the organization at issue has not elected to 
come under section 501(h). Furthermore, it is likely that 
organizations with policy advocacy as a primary or 
secondary, as opposed to incidental, focus will choose to 
place themselves under the more predictable 501(h) 
framework.
144
 
Commentators have overwhelmingly favored section 501(h) 
elections for public charities wishing to influence policy through 
legislative activity.
145
 The then-Assistant IRS Commissioner for 
                                                                                                                 
142 Michael S. Moriarty, Revised ‘Grass Roots Lobbying’ Regulations, TAX NOTES, Jan.–
Mar. 1989, at 149, 150 (1989). 
143 Galston, supra note 62, at 1280 n.26.  
144 Chisolm, supra note 17, at 26 (citations omitted). 
145 For examples of commentators favoring section 501(h), see Thomas R. 
Asher, Lobbying by Public Charities: The 1990 IRS Regulations, 20 NYU TAX PLAN. 501(C)(3) 
ORG. 3–1, § 3.06[2] (1992), Chisolm, supra note 17, at 26, Thomas A. Troyer & Amy R. 
Segal, Lobbying and Political Activities of Charities, 21 NYU TAX PLAN. 501(C)(3) ORG. 11–1, 
§ 11.02[5] (1993), and Thomas A. Troyer et al., Final Lobbying Regulations Provide Workable 
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Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations predicted as much, but 
one commentator opined that there would be “no rush” to take up the 
new election in part because of the hassle of “additional 
paperwork.”146 Based on statistics from 2009, both Professor Galston 
and Professor Chisolm appear to have been surprisingly less than 
prophetic: according to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
12,795 active 501(c)(3) organizations had made the election as of the 
fall of 2009.
147
 This number represents less than 1.3 percent of listed 
eligible charities at the time.
148
 The strange disinterest in this helpful 
safe harbor is hard to explain, except in light of the daunting 
complexity of the rules. 
For an eligible charity wishing to participate in the legislative 
process, the Expenditure Test provides significant benefits. The 
objective nature of the test permits charity managers to know exactly 
how much of their funds can be spent on lobbying and legislative 
activity without jeopardizing the organization’s exempt status. 
Furthermore, the clearly defined relevant terms let charity managers 
know precisely what they can spend those dollars on. Since the 
spending limitations are based solely on dollars spent, an election is 
quite favorable to any charity that can engage in “cheap” lobbying, 
for example on the Web or using volunteers. In fact, organizations 
that can lobby effectively using their Web sites and emails can engage 
in virtually unlimited lobbying under the Expenditure Test. The 
ability to use the Internet to influence the public (and perhaps 
Congress as well) on legislative matters renders the dollar limitations 
imposed by the Expenditure Test useless in many cases. Furthermore, 
the liberal member communication rules provide a benefit to member 
organizations by permitting them to lobby without burning up any 
                                                                                                                 
 
Guidance, 74 J. TAX’N 124, 130 (1991). 
146 Moriarty, supra note 142, at 150. 
147 501(h) Electors, NAT’L CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT., 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/knowledgebase/detail.php?linkID=454&category=13&xrefID=42
19&close=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
148 See Number of Public Charities in the United States, 2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR 
CHARITABLE STAT., 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PC (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012) (displaying the number of public charities as of April 2010). Even assuming that 
the number of churches and related ineligible organizations falls halfway between the 222,145 
501(c)(3) public charity organizations classified as “Religion Related, Spiritual Development” 
in IRS filings, id., and the 91,000 congregations (of any religion) that filed with the IRS as of 
2007, only approximately 1.5% of eligible organizations elected would have elected as of 2009. 
Identifying Faith-based Organizations in NCCS Databases (Method Note), NAT’L CENTER FOR 
CHARITABLE STAT., 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/knowledgebase/detail.php?linkID=85&category=118&xrefID=35
26&close=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
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Lobbying Nontaxable Amount or Lobbying Ceiling Amount, or by 
treating grassroots lobbying expenditures as direct lobbying 
expenditures, subject to a higher monetary cap.
149
 Finally, the many 
exceptions to the definition of lobbying contained in section 
4911(d)(2) permit “free” lobbying for charities engaging in lobbying 
that is not treated as lobbying for purposes of the Expenditure Test.
150
 
A well-counseled organization can use many of these excepted 
communications to impact policy without expending Lobbying and 
Grassroots Nontaxable Amounts. 
                                                                                                                 
149 See I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(D), 4911(d)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–3 (1990) 
(providing liberal allocation rules regarding what portion of a lobbying costs are direct lobbying 
expenditures and grassroots expenditures).  
150 I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2) states:  
For purposes of this section, the term “influencing legislation”, with respect to an 
organization, does not include— 
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or 
research;  
(B) providing of technical advice or assistance (where such advice would 
otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation) to a governmental 
body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a 
written request by such body or subdivision, as the case may be;  
(C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative body with 
respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the 
existence of the organization, its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or 
the deduction of contributions to the organization;  
(D) communications between the organization and its bona fide members 
with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the 
organization and such members, other than communications described in 
paragraph (3); and  
(E) any communication with a governmental official or employee, other 
than—  
(i) a communication with a member or employee of a 
legislative body (where such communication would otherwise 
constitute the influencing of legislation), or  
(ii) a communication the principal purpose of which is to 
influence legislation.  
Furthermore, in another example of generosity and leniency in the Expenditure Test 
definitions, “grass roots lobbying,” requires a reference to specific legislation, reflection of a 
view on that legislation, and encouragement of the recipient of the communication to take action 
with respect to the legislation, is easy to structure around by omitting any one of those factors. 
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(b)(2). 
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III. PROPOSAL I: ABANDON RESTRICTIONS ON LEGISLATIVE 
ACTIVITY BY PUBLIC CHARITIES 
A. Policy Reasons For and Against Permitting Unlimited 
Charitable Legislative Speech 
1. Policy Arguments For Unlimited Lobbying 
A plethora of sound policy reasons may be conjured to permit 
public charities to lobby. First, debate is good for society regardless 
of what is being debated and who is doing the debating, and lobbying 
by public charities increases the number of voices in the discourse. 
Moreover, public charities permit voices less often heard in the 
discourse to participate. Second, charities can be effective and 
efficient vehicles for the public’s participation in formulating public 
policy and the laws embodying that policy. As the late Professor 
Laura Brown Chisolm stated in her seminal article, Exempt 
Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 
“[M]any believe that the roles of advocate and improver of social 
systems, empowerer of citizens, and critic and monitor of government 
policies and programs are among the most crucial functions of the 
nonprofit sector.”151 Third, the rights of citizens to petition the 
government is fundamental to our notion of democracy.
152
 Fourth, 
organizations described in section 501(c)(4)
153
 that “promote social 
welfare” can lobby without limitation, presumably because lobbying 
is an activity that promotes social welfare.
154
 In fact, included in the 
definition of “charitable” in the Treasury regulations defining that 
term is the “promotion of social welfare.”155 If legislative activity 
promotes social welfare, it is therefore charitable and charities are not 
and should not be limited in the amount of charitable activity in 
which they can engage. And finally, a public charity lobbying to 
further the interests of its constituents just seems charitable, 
                                                                                                                 
151 Chisolm, supra note 21, at 205 (footnotes omitted). 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally Mayer, supra note 26, at 486 (“It is protected by 
the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress and by similar provisions in 
numerous state constitutions.”).  
153 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). 
154 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 539 (observing the benefits of legislative activity, 
including “supplying valuable information and advice for government decision makers, 
informing citizens of proposed and current government actions and thus increasing the 
transparency of government, and creating a mechanism through which citizens can both 
participate in politics generally and influence specific government actions”).  
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008). 
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particularly if the legislative activity furthers the charitable mission of 
the organization.
156
  
In sum, the charitable sector brings new perspectives to legislative 
discourse, and those perspectives serve to enlighten legislative 
discussion. In other words, “the voluntary sector [provides] 
‘countervailing definitions of reality and morality—ideologies, 
perspectives and world views that frequently challenge the prevailing 
assumptions about what exists and what is good and what should be 
done in society; [and] is most likely to say that the emperor has no 
clothes.’”157 For these reasons, Congress should eliminate the 
restrictions on lobbying by public charities to encourage legislative 
activity by these organizations.  
2. Policy Arguments Against Lobbying 
Policy reasons are occasionally cited for limiting charitable 
legislative activity. These include (1) the negative perception that 
Americans have of lobbying and lobbyists,
158
 (2) the argument that 
government should remain neutral with regard to lobbying by its 
citizens,
159
 (3) the notion that unrestricted lobbying is antithetical to a 
majoritarian system of government, (4) the comparison with 
businesses, individuals, and other entities as opposed to veteran’s 
organizations,
160
 and (5) the availability of the 501(c)(4)
161
 
alternative.  
Given Americans’ negative perception of lobbying and lobbyists 
in general, unlimited lobbying by charities might precipitate suspicion 
and negativity from the public. As Miriam Galston reflects: 
“‘Lobbying’ is a dirty word. . . . [And] most people associate 
                                                                                                                 
156 For example, an organization formed to feed the hungry should be entitled to weigh in 
on food policy in furtherance of its mission, and an environmental group should join the 
discourse on environmental policy to further its mission. Even the IRS would agree with this 
conclusion. See Rev. Rul. 80–279, 1980–2 C.B. 176 (holding that an organization engaged in 
legal research for and mediation of international environmental disputes, which included 
making its results known to the public by means of lectures, published articles, and interviews, 
qualified for 501(c)(3) exemption, because its activities constituted a long-recognized charitable 
purpose). 
157 Wilbur J. Cohen, Some Aspects of Evolving Social Policy in Relation to Private 
Philanthropy, in 2 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH 
PAPERS 657, 667 (1977) (citation omitted).  
158 See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text (discussing this perception). 
159 See infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text (discussing the neutrality argument). 
160 See infra notes 168–73 and accompanying text (making these comparisons). 
161 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006). Organizations described in section 501(c)(4) are exempt from 
federal income tax under section 501(a) and are operated for the promotion of social welfare. A 
501(c)(4) organization may further its purposes through lobbying as its primary or only activity 
without jeopardizing its exempt status but is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions 
under I.R.C. § 170(c). Id; I.R.C. § 170(c). 
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lobbying with pressure tactics at best, and with bribery or blackmail 
at worst.”162 Similarly, another commentator suggests that “[i]f one 
were to ask a friend, any friend, whether lobbying the legislature and 
campaigning for candidate X were charitable activities, four out of 
five answers would likely be quick, and negative.”163 While these 
statements ring true and may provide a convincing argument against 
requiring charities to lobby, they do not provide a similarly 
compelling case against permitting legislative activity by charities. 
First, charities will never be required to engage in legislative activity. 
The risk that lobbying will engender a negative public reaction is a 
risk that charities can choose to take or avoid. Presumably, a 
thoughtful board would weigh the potential damage of public 
suspicion against the benefit to be achieved by the legislative 
engagement and make an informed and rigorous decision. 
Furthermore, as long as charities lobby responsibly and in furtherance 
of mission, there is no reason to believe that negative reaction among 
those who support that mission would ensue. 
A second contention against permitting charities to lobby is the 
notion that governments should remain neutral with regard to 
lobbying by their citizens, refusing to take sides by “subsidizing” any 
particular lobbying effort. As Judge Learned Hand concluded in Slee 
v. Commissioner,
164
 “the Treasury stands aside” from political 
controversies (in that case, the provision of birth control).
165
 Learned 
Hand concluded that “[p]olitical agitation as such is outside the 
statute, however innocent the aim . . . .”166 Professor Chisolm perhaps 
said it best when she debunked the neutrality argument, concluding: 
Even if the present system could be accurately characterized 
as neutral, maintaining that neutrality would be misguided. 
Neutrality is neither constitutionally required, nor necessarily 
supportable as a matter of good policy. Rules which have the 
effect of either limiting or encouraging advocacy activity 
should aim to protect the integrity of the processes to which 
the advocacy is directed. Where technical neutrality 
contributes to unequal access to governmental institutions and 
processes, reinforces rather than relieves the chronic 
voicelessness of some segments of society, and leads to social 
policy built on incomplete information, it no longer provides 
                                                                                                                 
162 Galston, supra note 62, at 1270.  
163 Houck, supra note 34, at 85. 
164 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). 
165 Id. at 185.  
166 Id.; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959) (agreeing with 
Hand). 
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an acceptable foundation upon which to rest a system of 
controls and incentives.
167
  
Restrictions on legislative speech of charities skew, rather than 
augment, the legislative process. That price for alleged (or even 
actual) neutrality is too costly for society to bear. 
Some critics of lobbying by charities have asked, perhaps as an 
extension to the neutrality argument, Why permit charities to lobby 
with deductible contributions when businesses,
168
 individuals,
169
 and 
other entities
170
 cannot do so? In other words, Why should the 
government subsidize legislative activities of charities if legislative 
activities of other constituents are not similarly subsidized? First, this 
argument has several technical flaws, as businesses can deduct 
lobbying expenditures in many instances.
171
 Second, some 
organizations exempt under 501(a), specifically veterans’ 
organizations,
172
 can lobby without limitation with tax deductible, 
non-taxed dollars.
173
 This further erodes the “neutrality” argument, as 
well. Finally, as a policy matter comparing charities to businesses, 
individuals, and other noncharitable entities as an excuse for 
subjecting charities to the limits imposed elsewhere is unwise. Public 
charities likely to lobby generally represent a group of constituents 
traditionally less engaged in the legislative process.  
Finally, because charities can, under current law, set up a 501(c)(4) 
organization and engage in unlimited legislative activity, albeit not 
with tax deductible contributions, many argue that release of the 
limits within the 501(c)(3) are unnecessary.
174
 Although charities can 
                                                                                                                 
167 Chisolm, supra note 21, at 252 (footnotes omitted). 
168 I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.162–20(c)(3) (as amended in 1995). 
169 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (disallowing a charitable deduction for individuals who give to 
organizations that are disqualified for lobbying).  
170 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (business leagues). 
171 I.R.C. § 162(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.162–20(c)(3); see also Ronald S. Borod, Lobbying for 
the Public Interest—Federal Tax Policy and Administration, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1087, 1112 
(1967) (noting that “the business community can deduct their lobbying expenses, while all 
others cannot”). 
172 I.R.C. § 501(c)(19); see Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
548–551 (1983) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the preferential treatment afforded to 
veterans associations). 
173 The dollars are often deductible under section 170(a) (assuming an itemizing donor) 
and generally are not taxed to the organization (assuming the funds are not subject to the 
unrelated business income tax). I.R.C. §§ 170(a); 501(c)(3); 511–514. 
174 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous 
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1325 (2007) (arguing that 
charities receive “subsidies” for the nature of their work and the nature of their work does not 
include legislative activity, that if the charity engages in such activity, it should no longer 
receive their subsidy, and therefore, the organization should create a section 501(c)(4) affiliate if 
it wishes to engage in unlimited legislative activity); see also Chisolm, supra note 21, at 236 
(explaining the 501(c)(4) organization option).  
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set up 501(c)(4) organizations to carry on unlimited legislative 
activity, setting up and operating one is a significant burden both 
administratively and as a matter of fundraising.
175
 Furthermore, 
501(c)(4) organizations may represent different voices from affiliated 
501(c)(3)s because their funders may be unique and have diverse 
interests. Additionally, as noted above, the comparison with social 
welfare organizations suggests that limitations on legislative activities 
by public charities should be released.
176
 If lobbying is a social 
welfare activity and charities may be formed to “promote social 
welfare,” no logical conclusion for restricting lobbying by charities 
can follow. 
The policy arguments against charitable legislative speech are less 
compelling than the arguments for permitting the activity without 
limit. Unlimited legislative activity by charities should be encouraged 
in order to increase debate and the number of voices in the discourse. 
Both Congress and the public benefit from the increased and more 
diverse discourse. The benefits that would accrue to society from the 
additional debate would overwhelm any negative impact that may be 
feared.  
B. Technical Reasons For and Against Permitting Unlimited 
Charitable Legislative Speech 
1. Technical Reasons For Permitting Unlimited Charitable 
Legislative Speech 
A second, more technical, set of rationales for permitting unlimited 
lobbying by public charities is that current restrictions are ambiguous, 
confusing, ineffective, and outdated. The boundaries drawn under 
current law are unworkable and far too easily avoidable by a well-
lawyered organization. Moreover, both compliance with and 
enforcement of these rules is unnecessarily expensive.  
As mentioned above, the Substantial Part Test is far too vague and 
subjective to provide proper guidance to organizations wanting to 
influence legislation to further exempt purposes. While the 
Expenditure Test contains bright lines and helpful definitions, none of 
these lines or definitions is available to non-electors.
177
 And even the 
                                                                                                                 
175 See Chisolm, supra note 21, at 239–240 (explaining the difficulties implicit in the 
section 501(c)(4) option). 
176 See discussion supra Part III.A.I.  
177 If, ultimately, the law does not change and the Substantial Part Test remains the default 
measurement for lobbying, at the very least, the section 501(h) and section 4911 definitions 
should apply for purposes of that test. These definitions do apply to determine whether private 
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measuring rods for substantiality used in the Substantial Part Test are 
fuzzy. Various elements may be taken into account to determine how 
much lobbying is too much under the Substantial Part Test, including 
money spent, volunteer time employed, and the continuity and 
visibility (and perhaps the controversial nature) of the legislative 
activities, but no clear guidelines exist for identifying, much less 
weighing, these factors.
178
 Effectively, these nebulous boundaries 
restrict charities’ ability to lobby by failing to enlighten them as to 
how much legislative activity will jeopardize their exemption. In 
other words, charities tend to be so frightened of transversing this 
invisible line that they forego even “insubstantial” lobbying. In effect, 
ignorance paralyzes eligible charities and prohibits them from 
fulfilling their potential in impacting law and public policy.
179
  
While the Expenditure Test electable under 501(h) does not suffer 
from the same lack of clarity, it is ineffective, hypertechnical, and 
outdated in the twenty-first century. Unlike the subjective Substantial 
Part Test, the Expenditure Test is full of bright lines and crystal-clear 
definitions. As a legislative fix to the woes of the Substantial Part 
Test, it probably made terrific sense in 1976 when it was enacted.  
As mentioned above, the primary benefit of the Expenditure Test 
is clarity—both clarity as to how much an organization can spend and 
as to what it can spend on. A safe harbor with bright-line limitations 
should appeal to charities. It is therefore curious that less than 2 
percent of eligible charities have actually made the election.
180
 
The Expenditure Test’s primary difficulties are its over-complexity 
and that most of its restrictions are too easily avoided with the help of 
a knowledgeable lawyer. The test was enacted in 1976 and the world 
has changed quite a bit in the ensuing thirty-six years in many ways 
that impact the efficacy of the restrictions imposed under the 501(h) 
election. First, the World Wide Web was not around in 1976. 
Lobbying required drafting, printing, posting, stamping, and mailing 
letters, brochures, flyers, and pamphlets, and significant travel. In 
                                                                                                                 
 
foundations have lobbied. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2 (as amended in 1990).  
178 See Galston, supra note 62, at 1279–1280 (discussing the Substantial Part Test’s 
vagueness).  
179 See LESTER M. SALAMON & STEPHANIE LESSENS GELLER, JOHNS HOPKINS LISTENING 
POST PROJECT, COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 9, NONPROFIT AMERICA: A FORCE FOR DEMOCRACY (2008), 
available at http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/09/LP_Communique9_2008.pdf. This project surveyed a 
sample of 872 nonprofit organizations nationwide, 48 percent of which responded that they did 
not engage in lobbying because they were “[w]orried about violating laws.” Id. at 9. 
180 See CENTER FOR LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., supra note 8 (explaining that more than 
90 percent of charities have continued to use the Substantial Part Test).  
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other words, lobbying required lots of money. Today, organizations 
can and do lobby virtually for free on the Internet and use email to 
correspond with legislators and constituents. New technology makes 
it possible to schedule “virtual meetings” with legislators at virtually 
no cost.
181
 Organizations that lobby through the Internet and other 
modes of digital communication can reach millions, maybe billions, 
of people without spending much of their section 501(h) permissible 
lobbying amounts other than costs of employee time (where 
volunteers are unavailable) and connectivity (a trivial number by most 
accounts). Future technological advances inevitably will continue the 
march toward free (or inexpensive) lobbying not contemplated in 
1976. This makes and will continue to make the sections 501(h) and 
4911 limitations useless for wisely crafted lobbying. Useless 
restrictions should be repealed because they confuse but do not 
restrict. 
Second, the very liberal rules under section 4911 make it possible 
for many charities (particularly those with members) to engage in 
significant legislative activity that does not count as lobbying.
182
 The 
Internet multiplies the amount of “non-lobbying” lobbying a 
membership organization can accomplish. Again, properly structured 
lobbying can be practically limitless, so why impose limits? 
Effectively, most charities electing the Expenditure Test can lobby 
almost without effective limit if they employ a crafty and 
knowledgeable lawyer. The benefits of increased discourse and the 
inefficacy of the restrictions on lobbying mandate unrestricted 
lobbying for public charities. 
2. Technical Reasons Against Permitting Unlimited Charitable 
Legislative Speech 
The most significant technical argument against permitting 
unlimited legislative activity by charities centers on the possibility 
that the elimination of the current restrictions might result in abuse. 
For example, twenty-seven donors could unite to form a charity, pass 
                                                                                                                 
181 Participants in this kind of lobbying use e-mails, phone calls, Skype, and social 
networking tools like Facebook and Twitter to “meet” with legislators. Some organizations have 
organized a “Virtual Lobbying Day” during which they encourage members themselves to 
engage in a communication blitz upon legislators. See, e.g., Be a Part of the Innovation 
Movement’s Virtual Lobby Day, THE INNOVATION MOVEMENT, 
http://www.declareinnovation.com/?/issues/be-a-part-of-the-innovation-movments-first-ever-
virtual-lobby-day (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (inviting people to participate in a “Virtual Lobby 
Day”).  
182 See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–5 (1990) (allowing for “more lenient[]” treatment of certain 
lobbying expenditures involving communications to a charity’s members). 
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the public support test,
183
 and engage in selfish lobbying in public 
charity form.
184
 Alternatively, the selfish donors might achieve the 
same goal by setting up a supporting organization as defined in 
section 509(a)(3), assuming that they could identify (or perhaps 
create) a cooperative public charity to support.
185
 But selfish lobbying 
was precisely what Congress intended to avoid when it added the “no 
substantial part” language to the Code in 1934.186 Therefore, this 
possibility presents a genuine threat to the integrity of the operational 
test for charities.
187
  
Most would agree that an organization that engages in selfish 
lobbying (i.e., lobbying that promotes the individual interests of its 
leaders rather than the interests of the public it serves) should not pass 
the operational test for classification as a charity. On the other hand, 
as argued earlier, lobbying that furthers a true charitable purpose
188
 
should pass muster and should be encouraged by the law. The 
questions raised by this potential for technical abuse are: (a) how 
likely is this abuse to occur, and (b) how can the potential for abuse 
be mitigated?  
As to the first question, Congress disposed of much of the 
potential for selfish lobbying in 1969 when it defined legislative 
activity by private foundations as a taxable expenditure,
189
 effectively 
prohibiting any direct lobbying by private foundations.
190
 The 
possibility of creative structuring remains, which would enable 
entities that are functionally private foundations to qualify as public 
charities either under the public support test of section 509(a)(1) or as 
supporting organizations under section 509(a)(3), as mentioned 
above.
191
 With respect to supporting organizations, the risk is minimal 
(although not nonexistent) because of the requisite control that must 
be exercised by the supported organization for it to maintain its 
exempt status. Moreover, as the eminent scholar Marion R. Fremont-
Smith has convincingly argued, most charities operate for the public 
                                                                                                                 
183 See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (2006) (outlining the public support test). 
184 The group thus formed could avoid private foundation status under Code section 
509(a)(1) and the restrictions on legislative activity by private foundations. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1). 
185 See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (exempting organizations that are operated to support charities). 
186 For a discussion of legislative history of Revenue Act of 1934, see supra notes 44–48 
and accompanying text. 
187 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c) (as amended in 2008) (stating the operational test for 
determining whether a substantial part of a charity’s activities are lobbying). 
188 See supra note 156 for examples. 
189 I.R.C. § 4945; see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 47 (1970) 
(discussing the tax imposed on private foundations by the Tax Reform Act of 1969). 
190 See discussion of private foundations infra Part IV.A.1.  
191 See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text (discussing ways to circumvent the 
taxes imposed on private foundations). 
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good and intentional malfeasance is rare.
192
 But some creative 
structuring for selfish lobbying purposes inevitably occurs under 
current law and arguably would increase if restrictions on legislative 
activities of public charities vanished, which would increase the value 
of public charity status to selfish donors.  
This conclusion leads us to the second question, what to do about 
the abuse? Congressional and Treasury effort here should aim to 
reduce potential for abuse rather than to restrict legislative activity by 
well-intended charities. Abuse reduction might require heavy-handed 
anti-abuse laws that penalize only true culprits and deter only 
culpable charities and their managers but do not impact the innocent. 
Excise taxes and loss of exemption could be used to deter and 
penalize without quelling sincere legislative activity by charities. 
Arguably, these penalties are already in place for charities that serve 
selfish interests rather than public interests.
193
 Additional disclosure 
requirements might necessarily be implemented to help the IRS 
identify bad actors. Given the probability that the feared abuse will be 
minimal and the possibility of implementing additional disclosure and 
penalty provisions to identify and punish that abuse, the technical 
arguments raised against unlimited legislative activity by public 
charities do not outweigh the public good that charities can 
accomplish with unlimited lobbying.  
IV. PROPOSAL II: FIX THE EXPENDITURE TEST 
Although the elimination of restrictions on nonprofit legislative 
speech is the preferable outcome for the reasons discussed above, a 
distant second choice is to continue to impose lobbying restrictions 
through the Expenditure Test but to fix it, simplify it, and make it the 
default test for measuring permissible legislative activity by public 
charities. Specifically, this suggestion would require amending and 
expanding the Expenditure Test to make it more palatable for and 
accessible to a broader range of organizations by removing 
                                                                                                                 
192 See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Pillaging of Charitable Assets: Embezzlement and 
Fraud, 46 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 333, 334 (2004) (finding only thirty-two reports of criminal 
wrongdoing by lower-level employees targeting their own charities in 2003); Marion R. 
Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A 
Survey of Press Reports 1995–2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25, 33–34 (2003) (finding 104 
reports of criminal wrongdoing and fifty-four reports of a breach of fiduciary duty by officers 
and directors of charities over a seven-year period, and arguing that this small number relative 
to 1.4 million charitable organizations “does not on its face support congressional charges made 
during 2002 and 2003 of widespread abuses on the part of these organizations”). 
193 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4958 (excluding from the exemption organizations that 
participate or intervene in political campaigns and imposing excise tax sanctions on excess 
benefit transactions). 
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regressivity, increasing caps at least to keep pace with inflation, 
educating charities who fear it because they do not understand it, and 
making it the default test for all public charities. 
A. Expand the List of Eligible Organizations 
Not all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are eligible to 
elect the Expenditure Test. Excluded organizations include private 
foundations and churches.
194
 As a first step, the law should be 
amended to permit churches and their affiliates to use the Expenditure 
Test. 
1. Private Foundations 
The rationale for disqualifying private foundations
195
 is fairly 
obvious, although not necessarily justifiable. Congress was 
concerned, and perhaps rightly so, about selfish lobbying by private 
charities, since they are not subject to the restraints imposed by public 
accountability discussed above.
196
 There is simply too much private, 
rather than public, control and too much risk that deductible 
contributions and exempt funds will be used to further the personal 
interests of those in control of the foundation.
197
 Accordingly, in 
1969, Congress opted to significantly curtail legislative activity by 
private foundations by including amounts expended to influence 
legislation in the definition of “taxable expenditure,” subject to 
penalties under section 4945.
198
 
The restrictions on lobbying by private foundations have 
engendered much discussion. Foundations themselves have argued 
that the restrictions tie their hands and make them less effective.
199
 
                                                                                                                 
194 I.R.C. § 501(h)(3), (4), (5); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2 (as amended in 1990) (rules for 
private foundations). 
195 Private foundations are defined in I.R.C. § 509(a). 
196 See discussion of public accountability supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
197 Most private foundations mean well. Very few people would be concerned about selfish 
advocacy by some of the larger and most well governed foundations. But the risk still exists. 
Congressional hearings on the abuses of private foundations influenced future legislation. Such 
abuses included “competitive advantage, self-dealing, delay in benefit to charity, distraction of 
management, maintenance of control, and imprudent investment.” Richard Schmalbeck, 
Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 73 (2004).  
198 I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1); see generally Note, Regulating the Political Activity of 
Foundations, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1970) (detailing the restrictions and sanctions to be 
applied to private foundations under the Tax Reform Act of 1969). 
199 Largely motivated by a desire to remove lobbying restrictions and to have a voice in 
national debate, Pew Charitable Trusts chose to become a public charity in 2004. See Stephanie 
Strom, Pew Charitable Trusts Will Become Public Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at A20 
(noting a statement by Rebecca W. Rimel, then president and chief executive of Pew, “‘It will 
give us greater flexibility in our operations, as well as economies of scale that we could not 
achieve as a private foundation,’” and identifying one advantages as the ability “to lobby on 
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The American Bar Association Tax Section Exempt Organizations 
Committee has suggested that “[t]he absolute prohibition against 
lobbying activity in section 4945(d)(1) does not serve an articulated 
policy goal and adds burdensome complexity to grantmaking 
compliance.”200 This position may overstate the problem and 
understate the ability of a well-advised foundation to advocate. The 
ABA’s statement also overlooks Congress’s fairly well articulated 
policy goal of avoiding selfish lobbying.
201
 
The strict constraints on private foundation lobbying and the 
concomitant exclusion of private foundations from the Expenditure 
Test naturally impose a burden on a private foundation wishing to 
influence legislation in furtherance of its charitable purpose. But not 
all of the news for private foundations is bad. First, private 
foundations can engage in activities that influence legislation that are 
not defined as “lobbying” for purposes of the Expenditure Test.202 
The liberal definitions found in section 4911 give private foundations 
some wiggle room to influence legislation with rigorously structured 
“non-lobbying” lobbying.203  
Second, one could argue that private foundations are not subject to 
an “absolute prohibition on lobbying activity in section 4945(d)(1)”204 
because of the lenient rules permitting grants to public charities that 
do lobby. Although private foundations cannot directly engage in 
lobbying activities, private foundations are not prohibited from 
making general support grants to charities that engage in lobbying 
provided that the grant is not earmarked for lobbying.
205
 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
 
issues”).  
200 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, List of Code Provisions for Tax 
Simplification and Reform Project (unpublished work) (on file with New York University 
National Center on Philanthropy and the Law). See also Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Is It Time to 
Treat Private Foundations and Public Charities Alike?, 52 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 257, 257 
(2006) (suggesting “that in most respects the rationale for the disparity” between private 
foundations and public charities “is unfounded”). 
201 For a discussion of legislative history of Revenue Act of 1934, see supra notes 44–48 
and accompanying text.  
202 For example, a private foundation can engage in nonpartisan analysis, study, or 
research, or in self-defense lobbying, can provide technical advice to legislators, and can 
communicate with the public regarding pending legislation as long as no call to action is 
included in the communication. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4945–2(d), which significantly parallels 
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(b)(2) (1990). 
203 See id. (providing numerous examples of non-lobbying communications).  
204 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200.  
205 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(5)(i) (as amended in1990); see also Foundations, CENTER 
FOR LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., www.clpi.org/the-law/foundations (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) 
(“[F]oundations can provide project-related grants to charities that include lobbying so long as 
the grant is not “earmarked” for lobbying and does not exceed the non-lobbying portion of the 
project budget.”).  
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a private foundation special project grant to a public charity is not a 
taxable expenditure if none of the grant is earmarked
206
 for lobbying 
and provided that the total amount of the foundation’s special project 
grant does not exceed the amount budgeted by the charity for the non-
lobbying aspects of the special project.
207
 These permissive rules 
apply even if the public charity ultimately uses some of the grant for 
legislative activity.
208
  
Third, private foundation creators, like all other humans, can use 
their wealth to create an organization described in section 501(c)(4) 
and use the organization exclusively for legislative purposes.
209
 It 
may feel politically awkward, and contributions to the 501(c)(4) 
entity would not be deductible,
210
 but many of the biggest donors get 
minimal tax benefits from charitable contributions, in any event.
211
  
Finally, if all else fails, private foundations can use the “Pew 
method” to erase most effective lobbying restrictions.212 By forming a 
public charity and converting a private foundation into a supporting 
organization,
213
for that newly created public charity the former 
private foundation can effect an end run around the private foundation 
rules to advocate under the more lenient rules applicable to public 
charities. 
The issue of lobbying by private foundations is difficult to resolve, 
with convincing arguments on both sides of the debate. The 
limitations on legislative activities by private foundations do place a 
burden on private foundations wishing to engage in lobbying to 
further their charitable purposes. But the limits do not completely 
prohibit private foundations from influencing the formation of public 
policy. The hoops through which private foundations must jump 
                                                                                                                 
206 “Earmarked” is defined in Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(5)(i).  
207 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(6)(ii). 
208 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(7) Ex. (8), (9) (providing examples of 
circumstances where grants to a public charity not earmarked for attempts to influence 
legislation do not constitute taxable expenditures). See also, FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 
134.  
209 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).  
210 I.R.C. § 170(c). 
211 Warren Buffett, for example, donated stock worth over $1 billion to the Gates 
Foundation in 2010, but because of the 20 percent of AGI deduction cap for charitable 
contributions of stock to private foundations under section 170(b)(1)(D), and because Buffett 
has a rather low AGI compared to his total earnings (thanks to the long-term capital gains and 
qualified dividends tax rates), Buffet’s deduction was limited to the same amount he could have 
deducted had he donated $13 million, rather than over $1 billion. See Laura Saunders, What Did 
Warren Buffett Really Earn?, TOTAL RETURN BLOG, WALL ST. J. (October 19, 2011, 10:45 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2011/10/19/what-did-warren-buffett-really-earn.  
212 See Strom, supra note 199 (reporting the conversion of the Pew Charitable Trust to a 
public charity); David Bank, Pew Casts Itself in Fresh Role as a Public Lobby, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 6, 2003, at D5 (discussing Pew’s intent to influence public issues). 
213 I.R.C. § 509(a)(3). 
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inevitably do quell some useful advocacy, but the dangers of selfish 
lobbying do present a real risk. This may be another situation where 
simplification, transparency, and education rather than a substantive 
change in the law offers the best solution. 
2. Churches 
The reason for excluding churches
214
 from the list of organizations 
eligible to elect the Expenditure Test under section 501(h) is 
somewhat less transparent and necessary from a policy perspective. 
Such ineligibility was noted in the Senate Finance Committee Report 
as a response to the “specific request” of “a number of churches,”215 
and has been similarly described by commentators.
216
 Apparently, 
religious organizations lobbied to be excluded from 501(h) eligibility 
out of fear that some of their members would make the election and 
weaken their argument that the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
governmental restrictions on their legislative activity.
217
 The churches 
always lose this argument, and a body of law has developed through 
the courts confirming that churches and their affiliates are subject to 
the limitations on legislative activity imposed under the Code and 
elsewhere.
218
 Thus, excluding churches and their affiliates from 
making the section 501(h) election serves no purpose to the 
community that lobbied for the exclusion.  
Barring churches from eligibility to elect under section 501(h) is 
helpful neither to the churches nor to society, as the former could 
more easily further their charitable purposes under the Expenditure 
Test and the latter could benefit from the increased legislative 
discourse that churches could provide under the Expenditure Test. To 
increase the voices impacting our nation’s public policy, Congress 
should repeal section 501(h)(5) to allow churches to elect the 
                                                                                                                 
214 The term “church” in this context includes an integrated auxiliary of a church or of a 
convention or association of churches and their affiliates. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5). 
215 S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 84 (1976). 
216 See James H. Nix, Limitations on the Lobbying of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations—A 
Choice for the Public Charities, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 415–416 (1979) (citing a House report 
for the same proposition). 
217 See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc., v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856–68 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (addressing and rejecting Constitutional arguments of religious organization 
challenging the ability of the government to restrict its legislative activity); Branch Ministries v. 
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same). FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 134, at 
497. 
218 To make a First Amendment Free Exercise claim, a church would need to show that the 
restrictions unduly burden its free exercise rights. Courts have found that the sole effect of the 
loss of the tax exemption will be to decrease the amount of money available to the Church for 
its religious practices, and the Supreme Court has declared that such a burden “is not 
constitutionally significant.” Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 
U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (citation omitted). 
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Expenditure Test. If, as suggested later,
219
 the Expenditure Test 
becomes the default test for legislative activity rather than the elective 
test, that might make the test more politically palatable for churches. 
B. Eliminate the $1 Million Cap and Regressive Sliding Scale 
If lobbying restrictions must continue to plague charities, the $1 
million cap on lobbying expenditures and the regressive sliding scale 
should be vanquished. In 1976, when the caps were set,
220
 perhaps $1 
million was a lot of money, but it is not so much money today.
221
 And 
though an organization with a $17 million budget might have been 
large and fairly rare in 1976, today a significant number of eligible 
charities’ budgets are at or surpass $17 million. While many charities 
can lobby well within the 501(h) dollar limits in the twenty-first 
century, some charities inevitably will want to take lobbying to the 
next level. The $1 million cap for the lobbying nontaxable amount 
and the $1.5 million cap for the lobbying ceiling amount
222
 are way 
too low to accommodate non-web lobbying activities by any sizable 
organization, and the regressivity of the sliding scale cuts out too 
many organizations that might be able to make a difference in the 
world with their legislative efforts. And since these larger 
organizations are likely to spend more on lobbying under either test, 
the IRS should appreciate the more specific data from these 
organizations that would be delivered under 501(h).
223
  
First, to the extent that Congress continues to restrict lobbying 
with an Expenditure Test, the caps should be increased at least to 
reflect inflation since 1976. This would increase the Lobbying 
Nontaxable Amount cap to approximately $4 million and the 
Lobbying Ceiling cap (the more important cap) to $6 million.
224
 
Second, regressivity should be abandoned because there is no 
                                                                                                                 
219 See infra Part IV.E.  
220 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
221 $1 million in 2012 has the same buying power as $249,930.82 had in 1976. CPI 
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012); see generally Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices, 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) 
(providing an overview of the methodology used to calculate inflation).  
222 See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)(A), (2)(B) (2006) (providing that an exemption shall not be 
revoked unless an electing charity spends more than the “lobbying ceiling amount,” which is 
defined as 150 percent of the “lobbying nontaxable amount,” the maximum of which is $1 
million).  
223 This was one congressional goal in enacting I.R.C. § 501(h). See supra note 82 and 
accompanying text (noting this purpose).  
224 CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). Thanks to Professor 
Ellen Aprill for this suggestion. 
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particular reason to force charities with significant budgets into the 
fuzzy and unhelpful Substantial Part Test. The law should aim for a 
constant percentage of an organization’s exempt purpose expenditures 
that does not top out at a specified capped amount. 
C. Eliminate the Distinction Between Direct and Grassroots 
Lobbying 
The lower cap for grassroots lobbying
225
 as compared to direct 
lobbying is irrational and should be repealed. If caps survive, there 
should be one cap to cover all lobbying. If there is a rationale for any 
distinction in caps, grassroots lobbying should be subject to a higher, 
rather than lower, cap than direct lobbying. The lower cap on 
grassroots lobbying makes it more likely that charities will get into 
trouble by lobbying the public than by lobbying the government. This 
result makes little sense from either a practical perspective or a policy 
perspective. As a practical matter, grassroots lobbying may be more 
costly than direct lobbying, which suggests that a higher rather than 
lower cap should be available to make grassroots lobbying 
meaningful and effective. On the policy side, grassroots lobbying 
connects charities to the public, which seems more aligned with the 
purposes of a public charity, which also suggests that the lower cap 
on grassroots lobbying is unjustified. Furthermore, calculating two 
different limitations is unnecessarily burdensome and complex.
226
  
Legislative history to the 1976 legislation that implemented the 
distinct limitations on grassroots and overall lobbying expenditures 
did not elucidate any clear rationale for the distinction, other than 
some sort of nebulous fear that charities might create a “slush fund” 
for that purpose.
227
 Ill-fated legislation introduced in both the 
House
228
 and the Senate
229
 in 2003 would have eliminated the 
separate limitation on grassroots lobbying but the legislation did not 
pass. The elimination of the lobbying distinction, however, was not 
controversial, and the failure of the bills was unrelated to that 
provision. The Joint Committee on Taxation also has recommended 
eliminating the separate caps on overall and grassroots lobbying, 
stating that “there is no significant policy rationale for the separate 
limitations on grass-roots lobbying.”230 For both the practical and the 
                                                                                                                 
225 I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4). 
226 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200 (discussing the complexity of 
the rules).  
227 See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text (discussing this legislative history).  
228 H.R. 7, 108th Cong. § 206 (2003). 
229 S. 476, 108th Cong. § 303 (2003).  
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policy reasons mentioned above, the separate limitation on grassroots 
lobbying should be eliminated, and charities electing under 501(h) 
should be permitted to spend their entire nontaxable and ceiling 
amounts lobbying the public if they so choose. 
D. Other Corrections 
Two other changes to current law have been suggested by the 
American Bar Association Tax Section that would improve the 
operation of the Expenditure Test. First, section 4911(f), dealing with 
the application of the lobbying limits to affiliated organizations,
231
 
should be deleted because the provision is “a complex and 
unnecessary trap for the unwary.”232 Second, the Code should be 
amended to remove section 501(h)(7)
233
 because “the IRS has not 
developed a separate set of rules for non-electing organizations and 
has no plans to do so.”234 These changes are sensible and will reduce 
complexity for charities wishing to engage in the legislative process.  
E. Make the Expenditure Test the Default Test 
If the above amendments are made to the Expenditure Test, the 
restrictive impact and complex implementation of the Expenditure 
Test would be reduced, and charities would be more willing and able 
to generate policy reform and improve legislative discourse. The 
benefits of the Expenditure Test over the Substantial Part Test would 
be more marked even than under current law. Accordingly, the final 
suggestion is to make the Expenditure Test the default provision, 
eliminating the Substantial Part Test or making it the opt-in provision. 
If public charities are subject to restrictions on lobbying activity, they 
deserve clarity and bright lines. 
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CONCLUSION 
The restrictions placed on the legislative activities of charities are 
overly complex and under affective. The policies for promoting rather 
than limiting legislative activity by charities are compelling, and 
neither the legislative history to the 1934 limits nor the legislative 
history to the 1976 limits shed light on any rationale for the 
restrictions imposed. Furthermore, thirty-five years after the 
Expenditure Test was enacted, most charities electing the Expenditure 
Test under section 501(h) can lobby extensively, provided that the 
organization is well-counseled to take advantage of lenient rules and 
definitions under the election and employs inexpensive and free 
methods of lobbying. In the twenty-first century, the Expenditure Test 
is outdated, hypertechnical, and ineffective. The vagueness of the 
Substantial Part Test and the unnecessary complexity of the 
Expenditure Test rather than any real limits imposed by the Code 
suppress legislative activity by public charities. This suppression, in 
turn, limits the unique benefits that public charities can provide to 
society by increasing debate and diversifying the voices in legislative 
discourse. In light of these potential but unrealized benefits of 
increased lobbying by the charitable sector, section 501(c)(3) should 
be amended to permit unlimited legislative activity by all public 
charities. If Congress will not enact that amendment, as a distant 
second choice, the Expenditure Test should be improved and 
simplified and should serve as the default test for legislative activities 
of public charities.  
 
